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I
No contemporary problem of world order is more troublesome for an
international lawyer than the analysis of the international law of "inter-
nal war."' A war is usefully classified as internal when violence takes
place primarily within a single political entity, regardless of foreign
support for the contending factions.2 The insurgents who won the
American Revolution were heavily supported by French arms. Wars of
national liberation are not new, nor is external support for an incum-
bent regime. But considerable historical experience with foreign inter-
vention in internal wars has not been adequately incorporated into
prevailing doctrines of international law. In an age of civil turbulence
and nuclear risk, the requirements of world order make imperative
the effort to overcome the consequent confusion.8
The central issue is whether an externally abetted internal war
belongs in either traditional legal category of war-"civil" or "inter-
national." Four sub-inquiries are relevant. What are the legal restraints,
if any, upon national discretion to treat a particular internal war as an
international war? What rules and procedures are available to deter-
mine whether foreign participation in an internal war constitutes
"military assistance," "intervention," "aggression," or "an armed at-
* Milbank Professor of International Law, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs, Faculty Associate, Center of International Studies, Princeton Uni-
versity; B.S. 1952, Univ. of Pennsylvania; LL.B. 1955, Yale University.
1. See generally INTERNAL WAR (Eckstein ed. 1964); INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CIVIL
STRIFE (Rosenau ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as RoSENAU].
2. The "internalness" of an internal war is a consequence of the objectives and arena
of the violence. There are, of course, a range of different types of internal war. See
Rosenau, Internal War as an International Event, in ROSENAu 45, at 63-64. Rosenau use-
fully differentiates between internal wars, in terms of whether they are fought primarily
to achieve changes in the personnel of the leadership, the nature of political authority,
or the socio-political structure of the society.
3. For helpful exposition see Huntington, Patterns of Violence in World Politics, in
CHANGING PATTERNs OF MILITARY POLITICS 17 (Huntington ed. 1962); see also LOOMwILD,
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY FORCES 24-46 (1964). See the table classifying examples of Internal
war in terms of "basically internal," "externally abetted internal instability," and "exter-
nally created or controlled internal instability." Id. at 28-30. Incidentally, Professor
Bloomfield located the war in Viet Nam in the middle category as of 1964.
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tack"? What responses are permissible by the victim of "aggression" or
"an armed attack"? Finally, what should be the roles of national,
regional, and global actors in interpreting and applying the relevant
rules?
If the internal war is regarded as a "civil" war, then the legally
permitted response to intervention is restricted to counter-interven-
tion;4 an intervening nation whose own territory is not the scene of
conflict may not attack the territory of a state intervening on the other
side.5 If foreign intervention were held to convert an "internal" war
into an "international" war, the intervention could be regarded as an
armed attack that would justify action in self-defense proportionate
to the aggression. The victim of aggression is entitled, if necessary, to
attack the territory of the aggressor, expanding the arena of violence
to more than a single political entity.0 Given the commitment of inter-
national law to limiting the scope, duration, and intensity of warfare, it
would appear desirable severely to restrict or perhaps to deny alto-
gether, the discretion of nations to convert an internal war into an
international war by characterizing external participation as "aggres-
sion" rather than as "intervention."7
The American outlook on these issues has dramatically changed in
recent years. John Foster Dulles is properly associated with the expan-
sion of American undertakings to defend foreign nations everyvhere
against Communist takeovers by either direct or indirect aggression.
But even Dulles did not propose treating indirect aggression as the
equivalent of an armed attack by one country on another. In fact, dur-
ing the Congressional hearings on the Eisenhower Doctrine in 19578
4. I have developed this position in a paper given at the 1966 Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law under the title The International Regulation o1
Internal Violence in the Developing Countries, to be published in 19. Pnoc. Am. Soc.
INT'L L.
5. The assertion in the text must be qualified to the extent that the United States
decision to bomb North Viet Nam is treated as a law.creating precedent (rather than as
a violation).
6. If the conceptions of "aggression" and "armed attack" are so .ague that nations
can themselves determine their content, a self-serving legal description of the desired
course of state action can be given and is not subject to criticism in a strict sense. A
critic would be required to stress that an expansive definition of "armed attack," although
not forbidden by prior rules of law, was an unwise legal claim because of its status as
a precedent available to others and because of its tendency to expand tha scope and
magnify the scale of a particular conflict.
7. It is important to distinguish between the factual processes of coercion and the
legal labels used to justify or protest various positions taken by the participants. Aggres-
sion is a legal conclusion about the nature of a particular pattern of coercion.
8. The critical section in The Eisenhower Doctrine (1957) is Section 2:
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Dulles declared "... if you open the door to saying that any country
which feels it is being threatened by subversive activities in another
country is free to use armed force against that country, you are opening
the door to a series of wars over the world, and I am confident that it
would lead to a third world war." In my judgment, by bombing North
Viet Nam the United States is opening such a door and is setting a
dramatic precedent of precisely the sort that Dulles had in mind. Our
pride as a nation is now so deeply dependent upon a successful outcome
in Viet Nam that our Government seems insufficiently sensitive to the
serious negative consequences of the Viet Nam precedent for the future
of world order.'0
The appraisal of a claim by a national government that an act of
intervention is "aggression" is a complex task even if performed with
utter impartiality. It depends on assessing very confused facts as to
the extent and phasing of external participation, as well as upon inter-
preting the intentions of the participating nations. For instance, one
must distinguish in the behavior of an international rival between a
program of unlimited expansion through violence and intervention to
assure the fair play of political forces in a particular domestic society.
In the context of contemporary international politics, a crucial assess-
ment is whether Communism or specific Communist states propose
unlimited expansion by using unlawful force or whether they rely
upon persuasion and permissible levels of coercion." It is difficult to
obtain adequate evidence on the limits of permissible political and
para-military coercion.12 Arguably, even a program of maximum ex-
The President is authorized to undertake, in the general area of the Middle East,
military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations of that area desiring
such assistance. Furthermore, the United States regards as vital to the national interest
and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations
of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof,
the United States is prepared to use armed force to assist any such nation or group of
nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by
international communism: Provided, That such employment shall be consonant
with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Constitution of the
United States.
36 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 481 (1957).
9. The President's Proposal on the Middle East, Hearings before Senate Committees
on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 28 (1957).
10. The role of national claims of a unilateral nature in the development of inter.
national law is examined in Falk, Toward a Responsible Procedure for the National
Assertion of Protested Claims to Use Space, in SPACE AND SOCIETY 91 (Taubenfeld ed.
1964).
11. This is the main theme of a speech by the Secretary of State. See Rusk, Address,
1965 Paoc. Am. Soc. INT'L L. 247, 249-51.
12. I have discussed these issues in Falk, On Minimizing the Use of Nuclear Weapons:
[V/ol. 75:1122
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pansion should be countered by self-limiting responses aimed at neu-
tralizing Communist influence on internal wars and at building a
world order that minimizes the role of military force.15 We must also
not overlook the welfare of the society torn by internal war. The great
powers tend to wage their struggles for global dominance largely at the
expense of the ex-colonial peoples.14 These considerations support a
conservative approach to internal wars, an approach treating them as
civil wars, and permitting a neutralizing response as a maximum coun-
teraction. And, specifically, if efforts to neutralize Communist expan-
sion", in Viet Nam can be justified at all, the appropriate role of the
United States is to counter "intervention" rather than to respond to an
"armed attack."
The issue of self-determination is also relevant in the setting of inter-
nal war. If Communists or Communist-oriented elites can obtain po-
litical control without significant external support, it becomes difficult
to vindicate Western intervention in terms of neutralizing Communist
expansion. Castro's revolution represents a Communist success that was
achieved without significant external support until after political con-
trol of Cuba was fully established. Part of the objection to American
intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 arises from the absence
of prior foreign intervention. The policies of preventing war, minimiz-
ing violence, and localizing conflict seem in these contexts to outweigh
the objectives of anti-Communism; the United States serves both its
own interests and those of the world community by respecting the out-
come of internal political struggles. Unless we respect domestic political
autonomy, our adversaries have no incentive to refrain from participat-
ing on the side of their faction. The primary objective in relation to
A Comparison of Revolutionary and Reformist Perspectives, in FAI.L, TccKER, & YouxG,
ON MINrIMNG TnE UsE oF NUCL.A WEAPoNs I (Research Monograph No. 23. Centcr of
International Studies, Princeton University, March 1, 1966).
13. Everyone would agree in the abstract that it is important to reconcile policies
directed at limiting the expansion of adversaries with those aimed at avoiding warfare.
particularly nuclear warfare. See FAzn, LAw, MoRLrn', AND WIt 32.65 (1963).
14. Relative peace is obtained through mutual deterrence at "the center" of the inter-
national system. Struggles for expansion are confined to "the periphery" where the risks
of nuclear war can be minimized and where the costs of conflict can be shifted from the
great powers to the ex-colonial nations.
15. My own judgment, based on the analysis of the Geneva settlement in 1954, is that
the war in South Viet Nam represents more an American attempt at "rollback" than a
Communist attempt at "expansion." The Geneva Conference looked toward the reunifi-
cation of the whole of Viet Nam under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh. The introduction
into South Viet Nam of an American military presence thus appears as an effort to revere
these expectations and to deny Hanoi the full extent of its victory against the French.
Cf. also l.couruRE, VmENAm: BarwEEN Two TRucEs 17.68 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
LAcou'IRE].
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internal warfare is to establish rules of the game that allow domestic
processes of political conflict to proceed without creating undue risks of
a major war. In addition, human welfare and democratic ideals are best
served by allowing the struggle between Communist and Western ap-
proaches to development to be waged by domestic factions. Recent
events in Indonesia, Algeria, and Ghana demonstrate that these inter-
nal struggles for ascendancy are not inevitably won by Communists.
Civil strife can be analyzed in terms of three different types of violent
conflict.16 A Type I conflict involves the direct and massive use of
military force by one political entity across a frontier of another-
Korea, or Suez.17 To neutralize the invasion it may be necessary to act
promptly and unilaterally, and it is appropriate either to use force in
self-defense or to organize collective action under the auspices of a
regional or global institution. A Type II conflict involves substantial
military participation by one or more foreign nations in an internal
struggle for control, e.g., the Spanish Civil War. To neutralize this use
of military power it may be necessary, and it is appropriate, to take off-
setting military action confined to the internal arena, although only
after seeking unsuccessful recourse to available procedures for peaceful
settlement and machinery for collective security. A third type of con-
flict, Type III, is an internal struggle for control of a national society,
the outcome of which is virtually independent of external participation.
Of course, the outcome of a Type III conflict may affect the relative
power of many other countries. Hungary prior to Soviet intervention,
Cuba (1958-59), and the Dominican Republic prior to United States
intervention, typify this class of struggle. It is inappropriate for a for.
eign nation to use military power to influence the outcome. The degree
of inappropriateness will vary with the extent and duration of the
military power used, and also with the explicitness of the foreign na-
tion's role.'8 Thus, the reliance on Cuban exiles to carry out the anti-
Castro mission at the Bay of Pigs (1961) is somewhat less inappropriate
16. These "types" are analytical rather than empirical in character. In actual experi-
ence a particular occasion of violence is a mixture of types, although the nature of the
mixture is what makes one classification more appropriate than another.
17. Border disputes generating limited, but overt, violence by one entity against an-
other are a special sub-type under Type I that may or may not support a finding of
"armed attack" or a defensive claim of "self-defense."
18. See the emphasis on the covertness of the United States role in sponsoring the 3ay
of Pigs invasion of 1961 as an influential factor in the decision to proceed in Scssmori,
JR., A THOUSAND DAYS 23.-97 (1965). And note that Schlesinger's opposition to the invasion
was based in large part on his belief that it would be impossible to disguise the United
States' role. Id. at 253-54.
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than the use of United States Marines. Perhaps appreciating this dis-
tinction, North Viet Nam relied almost exclusively on South Viet-
namese exiles during the early years of the anti-Diem war.10
These three models are analytical tools designed to clarify the nature
and consequences of policy choices. Reasonable men may disagree on
the proper classification of a particular war, especially if they cannot
agree on the facts. An understanding of the controversy over the legality
of United States participation in the war in Viet Nam seems aided by
keeping in mind these distinct models.
The United States is treating the war as a Type I conflict. I would
argue, for reasons set out in the next section, that the war belongs in
Class III. But if this position entailing non-participation is rejected,
then the maximum American response is counter-intervention as is
permissible in a Type II situation.
Two general issues bear on an interpretation of the rights and duties
of states in regard to internal wars of either Type II or III. First, to
what extent does the constituted elite-the incumbent regime-enjoy a
privileged position to request outside help in suppressing internal chal-
lenges directed at its control?2 0 Traditional international law permits
military assistance to the incumbent regime during early stages of an
internal challenge. However, once the challenging faction demonstrates
its capacity to gain control and administer a substantial portion of the
society, most authorities hold that a duty of neutrality or non-discrim-
ination governs the relations of both factions to outside states.21 A state
may act in favor of the incumbent to neutralize a Type III conflict
only until the challenge is validated as substantial. A crucial question
is whether outside states can themselves determine the point at which
the challenge is validated, or whether validation is controlled, or at least
influenced, by international procedures and by objective criteria of
validation. The United States legal position stresses its continuing right
to discriminate in favor of the incumbent regime and to deny even the
political existence of the National Liberation Front (N.L.F.), despite
19. See, e.g., WARER, THE LAsT CoNFuCIAN 155 (1963) [hereinafter dted as WXtn];
FArL, THE Two VmT-NAeS 816-84 (rev. ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as Tim Two Vz-r.
NAMS].
20. See, e.g, Garner, Questions of International Law in the Spanish Civil War, 31 A.M.
j. T'L L. 66 (1937).
21. See generally THomAs & THoms, No,4-IN-mv'MMoN: TIM LAw ,ND ITs I.MPAcr In
THE AmERiCAS 215-21 (1956); see also LAUTERPAcHT, RECOGNITION IN INTE RnoATAL LAw
199-201, 227-33 (1957); Falk, Janus Tormented: The International Law of Internal War, in
ROSENAU 185, 197-209.
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the de facto existence of the N.L.F. over a long period and its effective
control of a large portion of the disputed territory.
22
A second question partially applicable to Viet Nam is whether it is
ever permissible to discriminate in favor of the counter-elite. The Com-
munist states and the ex-colonial states of Asia and Africa assume that
there are occasions warranting external participation in support of the
insurgent faction. The Afro-Asian states argue that political legitimacy
is established by an international consensus expressed through the
formal acts of international institutions, rather than by the mere
control of the constituted government. 23 This theory of legitimacy
sanctions foreign military assistance to an "anti-colonialist" strug-
gle. The extent to which this new attitude alters traditional inter-
national law is at present unclear, as is its full relevance to the conflict
in Viet Nam. The argument for applicability to Viet Nam would em-
phasize the continuity between the 1946-54 anti-colonial war in Viet
Nam and the present conflict. It would presuppose that the diplomatic
recognition of South Viet Nam by some sixty countries conferred only
nominal sovereignty, and that the Saigon regime is a client government
of the United States, which has succeeded to the imperialistic role of the
French. This approach implies that external states such as North Viet
Nam, China, and the Soviet Union have "the right" to render support
to the N.L.F.
These notions of permissible discrimination in favor of the consti-
tuted elite or the challenging counter-elite complicate considerably the
legal analysis of participation in a Type III conflict and blur the bound-
aries between Types II and III. Any adequate statement of the inter-
national law of internal war, must acknowledge this complexity, and
admit along with it a certain degree of legal indeterminancy. 24
II
The vast and competent literature on the war in South Viet Nam
provides an essential factual background for an impartial approach to
22. For a description of the extent of the N.L.F.'s governmental control see BugcaETr,
VmTNAM: INSIDE STORY Or Tm GUERILLA WAR 223-26 (1965); for legal argument see
LAuTERPAcHT, op. cit. supra at 175-238.
23. The legal status of a counter-elite in a colony is certainly improved by the re-
peated condemnations of colonialism in the United Nations and the recent passage of
formal resolutions calling for decolonialization. Factors other than claims to be the
constituted government are regularly taken into account in assessing claims of legitimacy
in international relations.
24. For the theoretical background on legal indeterminacy in international law see
Lauterpacht, Some Observations on the Prohibition of 'Non Liquet' and the Complete-
ness of the Law, in SYMBOLAE VERZIJL 196-221 (1958); Stone, Non Liquet and the Function
of Law in the International Community, 35 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 124 (1959).
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the legal issues presented in the Memorandum of Law prepared
by the State Department.25 It is impossible to summarize all of
the relevant facts, but it may be useful to indicate certain lines
of reasoning that account for part of my disagreement with the
official legal analysis. This disagreement reflects my interpretation
of the internal war as primarily a consequence of indigenous forces.
Even more, it stems from my concern for taking into account certain
facts entirely excluded from the Memorandum, such as the pre-1954
war against the French and the repression of political opposition by the
Diem regime.
It must be kept in mind that the present conflict in Viet Nam origi-
nated in the war fought between the French and the Vietminh for
control of the whole of Viet Nam, which was "settled" at Geneva in
1954.26 Although the intentions of the participants at Geneva were
somewhat ambiguous, the general view at the time was that the Geneva
agreements anticipated reunification under the leadership of Ho Chi
Minh by 1956 to coincide with the French departure. France came to
Geneva a defeated nation; the Vietminh held two-thirds or more of the
country.27 Had elections been held, it is generally agreed that reunifica-
tion under Ho Chi Minh would have resulted, however one interprets
the suppression of political opposition in the North or intimidation in
the South.28 Independent observers also agree that the anticipation of
the prospect of peaceful reunification led Hanoi to observe the Geneva
arrangements during the two years immediately following 1954. The
undoubted disappointment caused by the refusal of the French and the
Americans to make Saigon go through with the elections helps explain
the resumption of insurrectionary violence after 1956.2)
25. Among those most helpful see LAcouruRE; TuE Two Vi-r-Nma.ss; FALL, VLETNAM
Wxm'xss 1953-66 (1966) [hereinafter cited as VrrAm Wrrnrss]; SIArLm%, Tim LosT REvo-
LIrIoN (rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as SHAPLEN]; LANCASr, Tim EMANctPATnoN or
FRlENc Imo-CruNA (1961) [hereinafter cited as LANcASrm]; WARNm.
26. The settlement was not very realistic. It failed to take into account Saigon's ex-
clusion or the American opposition to the Geneva solution. No responsibility was imposed
upon the French to assure compliance with the terms of settlement prior to their with-
drawal. See WARNER 142-43.
27. For a general account see LANCAsTER 290-358; VmTNAm WvrrNESS 69-83; for the fullest
account of the Geneva negotiations see LAcourTuE & DEVILLERS, LA FIN D'UNE cUtRRuE (1960).
And see EjsENHOwER, MANDATE FOR CIANGE 332-75 (1963) for official American thinking
during this period.
28. There is agreement that an election held within the prescribed period would have
been won by Ho Chi Minh. See, e.g., SiAP. xi, WAmRE 14243; LA0out-uwR 32: "The
final declaration of the Geneva Conference foresaw, of course, that general election would
permit the reunification of Veitnam two years later. And none doubted at the time that
this would be to the benefit of the North."
29. See LAcouTuRE 32-50.
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The Vietminh did leave a cadre of 5,000 or so elite guerrillas in the
South, withdrawing others, as agreed, north of the Seventeenth Par-
allel.30 Those left in the South apparently went "underground," hiding
weapons for possible future use. This action seems no more than a
reasonable precaution on the part of Hanoi in light of Saigon's contin-
uing objection to the Geneva terms, and in view of Washington's evi-
dent willingness from 1954 onward to give Saigon political and military
support. Given the terms of conflict and the balance of forces in Viet
Nam prior to the Geneva Conference, French acceptance of a Viet
Nam-wide defeat, American reluctance to affirm the results of Geneva,
and Saigon's repudiation of the settlement, it seems quite reasonable for
Hanoi to regard a resumption of the civil war as a distinct contingency.
Although a decade of de facto independence (affirmed by diplomatic
recognition) now gives South Viet Nam a strong claim to existence as
a political entity, Hanoi certainly had no obligation in 1954 to respect
claims of an independent political status for Saigon."' To clarify the
diplomatic context in Geneva, it is well to recall that the Vietminh was
the sole negotiator on behalf of Vietnamese interests at Geneva in 1954.
Later in 1954 the Saigon regime under Premier Diem ruthlessly sup-
pressed all political opposition.3 2 Observers agree that organization of
an underground was an inevitable reaction to this suppression, and that
the N.L.F. at its inception included many non-Communist elements03
It also appears that Saigon was unwilling to negotiate, or even consult,
on questions affecting reunification, and was unwilling to normalize
economic relations with Hanoi. The great economic strain imposed
on North Viet Nam forced it to use scarce foreign exchange to obtain
part of its food supply from other countries.
8 4
Furthermore, the French military presence soon was replaced by an
American military presence prior to the scheduled elections on reuni-
fication.35 The evolution of an American "commitment" to Saigon's
30. Id. at 32-68; cf. ViETNA? WiTNEss 169-89.
31. Hanoi was "entitled" to prevent Saigon from establishing itself as a political entity
with independent claims to diplomatic status as a sovereign state. A separation of Viet
Nam into two states was not contemplated by the participants at Geneva.
32. See WARNER 107-24; LAcouTURE 17-31.
33. Fall, Viet-Cong-The Unseen Enemy in Viet-Nam, in THE VIET-NAM READER
(Raskin & Fall eds. 1965) [hereinafter cited as VIET-NAM READER].
34. LAcotrruRE 34-35, 68.
35. This is the major thesis of Lacouture, Vietnam: The Lessons of War, reprinted
from the New York Reveiw of Books, March 3. 1966, p. 1, in Hearings on S.2793 Before
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 655-61 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as VIETNAM HEARINGS].
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permanence and legitimacy contrasts radically with both the expecta-
tions created at Geneva in 1954 and the subsequent attitudes of the
French. United States involvement in the politics of South Viet Nam
increased constantly; it was no secret that the Diem government largely
was constituted and sustained in its early months by the United States.30
Despite the escalating American political, military, and economic
assistance, the Saigon regime proved incapable of achieving political
stability. Numerous regimes have come and gone. None has com-
manded the respect and allegiance of any significant segment of the
population. Often in situations of civil war diverse factions are able to
establish an expedient working unity during the period of common
national emergency. The N.L.F. seems to maintain substantial control
over its heterogeneous followers while one Saigon regime after another
collapses or totters on the brink. The United States recognized at an
early stage that the Saigon regime had to transform its own feudal
social structure before it could provide the basis for viable government
in South Viet Nam.37 This is a most unusual demand by an external
ally; it bears witness to the fragile and dubious claim of each successive
Saigon regime to govern even the parts of South Viet Nam not held by
the Vietcong.
In addition, Saigon and the United States seem to have neglected
repeated opportunities for negotiations with Hanoi during earlier
stages of the war.38 As late as February, 1965, the United States gov-
ernment rebuked U Thant for engaging in unauthorized negotiations.
Until the prospects for a military solution favorable to Saigon dimin-
ished to the vanishing point, the United States made no attempt to
negotiate a peaceful settlement or to entrust responsibility for settle-
ment to either the Security Council or the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva
36. For an account of the covert dimension of the United States role in the domestic
affairs of South Viet Nam see WIs S Ross, TnE INVIsIBLE GovERx.%m%'T 155-64 (1964). There
are also references to the exercise of covert influence by the United States in L. cotrrun
Sm s'LEN, and WARNER. American strategies of covert influence in foreign countries are
analyzed and described in BrLAcsrocx, Tim STaEGY oF StavRsioN (1964).
37. Cf. letter of President Eisenhower to Premier Diem on October 23, 1954, SNrATE
Com.nTrEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 89TH CONG., 1ST Sass., BACKIGROUND I FoRMATION RE.
LATING TO SouTEAsT ASIA AND VIETNAM (Comm. Print 1965) [hereinafter cited as BAcK-
GROUND INFORMATION]. For a recent reiteration, see U.S. and South Vietnamese Leaders
Meet at Honolulu, 54 DEP'T SrAE BULL. 302-07 (Feb. 28, 1966).
58. The American approach to a negotiated settlement is recounted and criticized in
AimcAN FRIENDs SERvIcE CoswssrrEE, PEAcE IN VtEr NAm 50-67 (1965). Among other
observations, this report points out that "a careful reading of the New Yori: Times shows
that the United States has rejected no fewer than seven efforts to negotiate an end to the
war." Id. at 51. See also the artide by Flora Lewis, in VIETNAM HEARNGS, 323-24.
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Conference.3 9 This reluctance, when added to the political losses suf-
fered by Hanoi at Geneva in 1954, makes it easier to comprehend
Hanoi's reluctance to negotiate now.
40
All of these considerations lead me to regard the war in South Viet-
nam primarily as a Type III conflict, in which the United States ought
not to have participated. Because of Hanoi's increasing participation on
behalf of the Vietcong, it is arguable, although rather unpersuasive,
that this war is properly categorized as an example of Type II, so that
the United States could legitimately give military assistance to Saigon,
but is obligated to limit the arena of violence to the territory of South
Viet Nam. The weakness of the Saigon regime compared to the N.L.F.
renders necessary a disproportionately large military commitment by
the United States to neutralize the indigenous advantages of the Viet-
cong and the support of Hanoi. 41 Our disproportionate commitment
makes it appear that the United States rather than Hanoi is escalating
the war. And this appearance undercuts any defense of our participa-
tion as necessary to offset participation on the other side, and thereby
39. For predictions of an American victory in South Viet Nam, see Raskin & Fall,
Chronology of Events in Viet-Narn and Southeast Asia, BACKGROUND INFORMATION 377,
388-89, 390-92. As late as October 2, 1963, Secretary McNamara and General Taylor issued
an official statement reporting their conclusion that "the major part of the United States
military task can be completed by the end of 1965"; and on November 1, 1963 General
Paul D. Harkins, U.S. military commander wrote in Stars & Stripes (Tokyo) that "Victory
in the sense it would apply to this kind of war is just months away and the reduction
of American advisers can begin any time now." The point of quoting these statements
is to suggest that as long as a favorable military solution seemed forthcoming at a tolerable
cost the United States was not interested in a negotiated settlement.
40. An important element in the background of Vietnamese history was the successful
resistance movement led by Ho Chi Minh against the Japanese in the closing years of
World War II. When the Japanese left French Indo-China, Ho Chi Minh was in control
of the entire territory, and was induced to accept the return to power of the French
colonial administration in exchange for promises of political independence that were never
fulfilled. The recollection of this first phase of the Vietnamese war, when added to the
post-1954 experience may deepen Hanoi's impression that its political success depends
upon military effort. On negotiating with Hanoi, see also the REPORT OF TlUE AD HOC
CONGRESSIONAL CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM, 89Tw CONG., 2D SES. 4-5 (Comm. Print 1966)
[hereinafter cited as AD Hoc CONGRESSIONAL CONFERENCE].
41. Bernard Fall, writing on the sort of military superiority that is required to achieve
victory over an insurgency, says:
... in the past it [victory] has required a ratio of pacification forces versus insurgents
that is simply not available in Viet-Nam today [Jan. 1965]. In Malaya, British and
Malayan forces have achieved a ratio of 50 to 1; in Cyprus, British forces had achieved
a 110 to 1 ratio, and in Algeria the French had reached 10 to 1. The present ratio
in South Viet-Nam is 4.5 to 1, and the French ratio in the First Indochina War was
an incredibly low 1.2 to 1, which (all other matters being equal) would suffice to ex-




give "the true" balance of domestic forces a chance to control the out-
come.4 - The State Department Memorandum assumes that the war is
a Type I conflict, and argues that American participation is really
collective self-defense in response to an armed attack by North Viet
Nam upon South Viet Nam. But to characterize North Viet Nam's par-
ticipation in the struggle in the South as "an armed attack" is unwise
as well as incorrect. Such a contention, if accepted as an authoritative
precedent, goes a long way toward abolishing the distinction between
international and civil war. The war in South Viet Nam should be
viewed as primarily between factions contending for control of the
southern zone, whether or not the zone is considered a nation.43 A claim
of self-defense by Saigon seems misplaced, and the exercise of rights
of self-defense by committing violent acts against the territory of North




The Memorandum of the State Department was submitted by the
Legal Adviser to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on March
8, 1966.45 In assessing it, we should keep in mind several considerations.
First, the United States Government is the client of the Legal Adviser,
and the Memorandum, as is entirely appropriate, is an adversary docu-
ment. A legal adviser in Hanoi could prepare a comparable document.
Adversary discourse in legal analysis should be sharply distinguished
from an impartial determination of the merits of opposed positions.4 0
42. Official United States Government statements frequently imply that the United
States must render help to the Saigon regime equivalent to the help given by Hanoi to
the N.L.F. If "equivalent" is measured by the needs of the ratio, then it may be as much
as 110 times as great as the aid given to the insurgents, whereas if equivalent means arith-
metically equal, it will be completely ineffectual.
43. Hanoi itself takes a conflict-confining position that the war in Viet Nam is a civil
war being waged to determine control of South Viet Nam rather than a civil or inter-
national war to determine control of the whole of Viet Nam. See, e.g., Policy Declaration
of Premier Pham Van Dong of North Viet-Nam, April 14, 1965, in ViEr-N,"t RznADE
342-43 ("Hanoi's Four Points'). See also Program of the National Liberation Front of
South Viet-Nam, id. at 216-21 (on Dec. 20, 1960).
44. But, as of July 1966, the United States has not attacked North Vietnamese centers
of population and has made only limited attacks on industrial complexes (oil depots).
The unjustified claim of self-defense has been noted, but it is well to appreciate the as
yet restrained form of the claim.
45. An earlier, somewhat skimpy, memorandum, The Legal Basis for U.S. Actions
against North Vietnam, was issued by the Department of State on March 8, 1965; for the
text see BACKGROUND INFORUTION 191-94.
46. I have tried to urge a non-adversary role for the international lawyer on sev-
eral ocasions: see Falk, The Adequacy of Contemporary Theories of International Law-
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Second, the Legal Memorandum was evidently framed as a response
to the Memorandum of Law prepared by the Lawyers Committee on
American Policy Toward Viet Nam .4 7 The argument of the Lawyers
Committee fails to raise sharply the crucial issue-namely, the discre-
tion of the United States to delimit its legal rights and duties by treat-
ing the conflict in South Viet Nam as an international war of aggression
rather than as a civil war.48
Third, the Legal Adviser's Memorandum implies that both the facts
of aggression and the legal rules governing self-defense are clear. This
is misleading. Except in instances of overt, massive aggression across
an international frontier, international law offers very indefinite guid-
ance about the permissible occasions for or extent of recourse to force
in self-defense. Doctrinal ambiguity is greatest with respect to internal
wars with significant external participation.49 International law offers
very little authoritative guidance on the central issue of permissible
assistance to the contending factions. 0 To conclude that international
law is indefinite is not to suggest that it is irrelevant. On the contrary,
if rules are indefinite and procedures for their interpretation unavail-
able, prevailing national practice sets precedents for the future. In this
light, American activity in Viet Nam is particularly unfortunate for
the future of doctrines aimed at limiting international violence. 1
Gaps in Legal Thinking, 50 VA. L. REV. 231, 233-43 (1964); and a recent paper delivered
at the Harris Conference on New Approaches to International Relations, at the Univer-
sity of Chicago, June 1966, with the title, New Approaches to the Study of International
Law 3-9 (paper available in mimeographed form, to be published subsequently In con-
ference volume).
47. See Lawyers Committee on American Policy Toward Vietnam, American Policy
Vis-al-Vis Vietnam, Memorandum of Law, in VIETNAM HEARuNGs 687-713.
48. The Spanish Civil War is a useful historical precedent for the legal treatment of
large-scale foreign interventions on both sides of an internal war. For a full analysis
see PADELFORD, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY IN THE SPANISH CIVIL STRIPE (1939).
Another way of posing the issue would be to ask whether Cuba, after the Bay of Pigs
invasion, might have been entitled to ask the Soviet Union for military assistance, Includ-
ing air strikes against staging areas in the United States. For a critical account of the legal
status of American participation in the Bay of Pigs invasion see Falk, American Interven.
tion in Cuba and the Rule of Law, 22 OHIO ST. LJ. 546 (1961).
49. I have argued to this effect, in ROSENAU 210-40.
50. By "authoritative guidance" I mean guidance of action by clear, applicable rules
of international law that are congruent with community expectations about permissible
behavior; the rules must be clear enough to permit identification of a violation without
independent fact-finding procedures.
51. International customary law evolves as a consequence of national claims and coun-
ter-claims acquiring through time an authoritative status. States assert these claims and
counter-claims to maximize policy considerations in various contexts. For a major exposi-
tion of this process see MCDOUGAL & BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDR OF T OCEANS (1962),
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In this section I propose to criticize the legal argument of the Mem-
orandum, taking some issue with both inferences of fact and conclusions
of law. I will analyze the consequences of characterizing international
participation in Viet Nam as intervention and counter-intervention in
an ongoing civil war. Although I will call attention to the shortcomings
in the legal position of the United States, my main intention is to
approach this inquiry in the spirit of scholarly detachment rather than
as an adversary critic.52 Such detachment is not value-free. I try to
appraise the claims of national actors in light of the requirements of
world order. My appraisal presupposes the desirability of narrowing the
discretion of nations to determine for themselves the occasions on which
violence is permissible or that an increase of the scale and scope of
ongoing violence is appropriate. I am convinced that it is important for
any country (including my own) to reconcile its foreign policy with the
rules regulating the use of force in international affairs, and that, there-
fore, it does not serve even the national interest to accept a legal justi-
fication for our own recourse to violence that we would not be prepared
to have invoked against us by other states similarly situated.0 The
international legal order, predominantly decentralized, depends for
effectiveness on the acceptance by principal states of the fundamental
ordering notions of symmetry, reciprocity, and national precedent-
setting.54
In analyzing the Memorandum I will adhere to its outline of issues,
concentrating on the most significant.
Collective Self-Defense. The Memorandum argues that the United
States may, at Saigon's request, participate in the collective self-defense
of South Viet Nam because North Viet Nam has made a prior armed
attack. But may indirect aggression be treated as an armed attack with-
out the approval of an appropriate international institution? The
United States rests its case on the role of Hanoi in the period between
1954 and 1959 in setting up "a covert political-military organization"
and by its infiltration of "over 40,000 armed and unarmed guerrillas
52. An adversary debate may be useful to clarify the legal issues, but an impartial
perspective is also needed to help in the process of choosing among the adversary presen-
tations.
53. America's relative inability to make effective legal protests against further nuclear
testing on the high seas and in the atmosphere is partly a result of America's earlier legal
defense of its own similar behavior. A legal precedent is created by the effective as.sertion
of a claim to act, and this precedent may be difficult to repudiate, even if the precedent-
setter has greater power than does the actor relying upon the precedent.
54. See FALK, Ta ROLE OF Doas'sc COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OrUnn 21-52
(1964).
1966] 1135
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
into South Viet Nam" during the subsequent five years. The Memo-
randum concludes that "the external aggression from the North is the
critical military element of the insurgency," that "the infiltration of
thousands of armed men clearly constitutes an 'armed attack' under any
reasonable definition," and that although there may be doubt as to "the
exact date at which North Viet Nam's aggression grew into an 'armed
attack,' [it certainly] had occurred before February 1965."
. This argument is questionable on its face, that is, without even
criticizing its most selective presentation of the facts. Consider first the
highly ideological character of prevailing attitudes toward the just use
of force. The Communist countries favor support for wars of national
liberation; the West-in particular, the United States--favors support
for anti-Communist wars; and the Afro-Asian states favor support for
anti-colonialist and anti-racist wars. 5 Consider also the importance,
acknowledged by the United States in other settings,50 of circumscribing
the right of self-defense. The use of force on some other basis--for
example, defensive intervention or regional security-moderates rather
than escalates a conflict. But the invocation of self-defense as a rationale
during a conflict previously contained within a single state tends to
enlarge the arena of conflict to include states that are claiming and
counter-claiming that each other's intervention in the civil strife is an
armed attack. If the infiltration constitutes an armed attack, the bomb-
ing of North Viet Nam may be justified. But if North Viet Nam had
operative collective defense arrangements with China and the Soviet
Union it is easy to project a scenario of escalation ending in global
catastrophe. If, on the other hand, infiltration is merely intervention,
and appropriate responses are limited to counter-intervention, the area
of violence is restricted to the territory of South Viet Nam and its
magnitude is kept within more manageable limits.
5 7
The argument in the Memorandum also assumes that armed help
to the insurgent faction is under all circumstances a violation of inter-
national law. As mentioned earlier, at some stage in civil strife it is
55. Compare with these claims the prohibitions upon the use of force expressed in
absolute terms in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. Self-defense against a prior
armed attack appears to be the only permissible national basis for the use of force (without
authorization from the United Nations).
56. See, e.g., avoidance of a self-defense rationale by government officials offering legal
justification for the United States claims to interdict on the high seas Soviet intermediate
range ballistics bound for Cuba in 1962. Meeker, Defensive Quarantine and the Law, 57
AM. J. INT'L L. 515 (1963); Chayes, The Legal Case for U.S. Action on Cuba, 47 Dn-T
STATE BULL. 763 (1962).
57. For a fuller rationale see Falk, supra note 4.
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permissible for outside states to regard the insurgent elite the equal
of the incumbent regime and to render it equivalent assistance.5s Since
no collective procedures are available to determine when an insurgency
has proceeded far enough to warrant this status, outside states enjoy
virtually unlimited discretion to determine the comparative legitimacy
of competing elites. 9 In effect, then, no rules of international law exist
to distinguish clearly between permissible and impermissible interven-
tion in civil strife.60 To call hostile intervention not only impermissible
but an instance of the most serious illegality-an armed attack-seems
very unfortunate. In addition to a tendency to escalate any particular
conflict, the position that interventions are armed attacks so broadens
the notion of armed attack that all nations will be able to make plausible
claims of self-defense in almost every situation of protracted internal
war. It therefore seems desirable to confine the armed attack/self-
defense rationale to the Korea-type conflict (Type I) and to deny its
applicability in Viet Nam, whether the war in Viet Nam is denominated
Type II or Type III. The Memorandum's argument on self-defense is
also deficient in that it relies upon a very selective presentation of the
facts. It ignores Saigon's consistent opposition to the terms of the
Geneva settlement, thereby casting in very different light Hanoi's
motives for the steps it took in South Viet Nam to assert its claims. 1
It is essential to recall that the pre-1954 conflict was waged for control
of all of Viet Nam and that the settlement at Geneva was no more than
"a cease-fire." President Diem's ruthless suppression of political opposi-
tion in South Viet Nam from 1954 onward, in violation of the ban on
political reprisals included in the Geneva Agreements, is also relevant.6 2
58. Cf. the study of the international relations of the insurgent groups during the
Algerian War of Independence by M. BEDJAOui, LAw AND THE ALr.EAN REvOLUrrON (1961).
59. If "the will of the international community" operates as the true basis of inter-
national law, the criteria of legitimacy shift to correspond to the values of the expanded
membership in international society.
60. See LAUTERPACuT, op. cit. supra note 21, at 253-55.
61. If mutuality is the basic condition for the existence of a legal obligation, it is
essential that both disputants accept the terms of settlement. If there is non-acceptance
on one side, the other side is in a position to protect its position as if the settlement did
not exist. In the setting of Viet Nam this would suggest that Hanoi was free to pursue its
war aims on a pre-1954 basis and ignore the division of the country into two zones. It is
ironic that South Viet Nam owes its original political identity entirely to the Geneva
Agreements.
62. Cf. Article 15, Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities: "Each party undertakes
to refrain from any reprisals or discrimination against persons or organizations for their
activities during the hostilities and also undertakes to guarantee their democratic free-
doms." BACKGROUND INFORIMATION 50, 53. See LACOUTURE 28-31; BURCUETr, VLETNAM-
INsIDE STORY OF THE GUERILLA WAR 109-28 (1965).
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Furthermore, the injection of an American political and military
presence was, from the perspective of Hanoi, inconsistent with the
whole spirit of Geneva. 63 The United States decision to commit itself
to maintaining a Western-oriented regime in South Viet Nam upset
the expectations regarding the Southeast Asian balance of power; in
that respect, it was similar to the Soviet attempt to upset the Caribbean
balance of power by installing intermediate-range missiles in Cuba in
1962.64
The Memorandum seems to concede that until 1964 the bulk of
infiltrated men were South Vietnamese who had come north after the
cease-fire in 1954. The use of exiles to bolster an insurgent cause appears
to be on the borderline between permissible and impermissible behavior
in contemporary international politics. The role of the United States
Government in sponsoring the unsuccessful invasion at the Bay of Pigs
in 1961 was a far more flagrant example of the use of exiles to overthrow
a constituted government in a neighboring country than the early role
of Hanoi in fostering an uprising in the South. 5 The claim by the
United States to control political events in Cuba is far more tenuous
than the claim by North Viet Nam to exercise control (or at least
remove the influence of a hostile superpower) over political life in the
South. 6 And Castro's regime was domestically viable in a manner that
Saigon regimes have never been-suggesting that South Viet Nam
presents a more genuine revolutionary situation than does contempo-
rary Cuba. It seems more destructive of world order to help overthrow
63. The operative great power in the area was France. It was not in Hanoi's Interest
to give up a favorable battle position so that the United States could replace the French
military presence. The worsening of their position in the area as a result of the nego-
tiations at Geneva may explain, in part, their reluctance to negotiate a "settlement" and
give up a favorable military position once again.
64. One influential view of the basis of international order stresses maintaining current
balances and expectations. Any attempt to rely upon military means to upset these balances
and expectations is perceived and treated as "aggression." The intrusion of Soviet military
influence into the Western Hemisphere by attempting to emplace missiles constituted
the provocative element. The same military result could have been achieved by increasing
the Atlantic deployment of missile-carrying submarines. This sense of "provocative"
might also describe the perception of the escalating American military commitment In
Southeast Asia.
65. For an authoritative account of the United States role see SCtLFSINGEn, JR., A
THOUSAND DAYS 206-97 (1965).
66. The strength of Hanoi's claim arises from the prior struggle to control the entire
country, the military victory by the Vietminh in that struggle, the expectations created
at Geneva that the elections would confirm that military victory, the delimitation of South
Viet Nam as "a temporary zone," and, finally, the refusal by South Viet Nam to consult on
elections or to refrain from reprisals.
1138 [Vol. 75:1122
VIET NAM: CRITIQUE
a firmly established government than to assist an ongoing revolution
against a-regime incapable of governing.
African countries admit helping exiles overthrow governments under
white control.67 American support for Captive Nations Week is still
another form of support outside of the Communist bloc for exile
aspirations. 8 In short, international law neither attempts nor is able
to regulate support given exile groups. The activities of Hanoi between
1954 and 1964 conform to patterns of tolerable conflict in contemporary
international politics.
The Memorandum contends that subsequent to 1964, Hanoi has
increasingly infiltrated regular elements of the North Vietnamese army
until at present "there is evidence that nine regiments of regular
North Vietnamese forces are fighting in the South." Arguably, the
N.L.F. was not eligible to receive external support in the early years
of strife after 1954, as its challenge to the government amounted to
no more than "a rebellion." But certainly after the Vietcong gained
effective control over large portions of the countryside it was permissible
for North Viet Nam to treat the N.L.F. as a "belligerent" with a right
to conduct external relations.69 This area of international law is ex-
ceedingly vague; states have a wide range of discretion in establishing
their relations with contending factions in a foreign country.70
The remainder of the first section of the Memorandum responds
to the Lawyers Committee Memorandum of Law, but is not relevant
to the solution of the critical legal questions. It is persuasive but trivial
for the State Department to demonstrate that international law recog-
nizes the right of individual and collective self-defense against an armed
67. In the Final Act of the Conference of Heads of States or Governments at Cairo
in 1964 the following declaration was made by the forty-seven non.aligned powers assm.
bled: "Colonized people may legitimately resort to arms to secure the full exercise of their
right to self-determination."
68. For perceptive discussion of the status of "Captive Nations Week" in international
law see Wright, Subversive Intervention, 54 Am. J. INfrr L 521 (1960).
69. See the extent of international recognition accorded the F.LN. in Algeria during
their war against the French, BrEDjAou, op. cit. supra note 58, at 110-38.
70. No dear rules of prohibition nor any required procedures exist which subject
national discretion to international review. National discretion consequently governs
practice.
For useful discussions stressing the survival under the United Nations Charter of a
wider right of self-defense than the interpretation offered here see Zo%%r, SEx.-Drr.,sx
IN INTERNAriONAL LAw 182-99 (1958); MCDOUGAL & FEuCtAmO, LAw A1 D MINIMUM WORLD
Punuc ORDER 121-260 (1961); for a position similar to the one taken in the text see Henkin,
Force, Intervention and Neutrality in Contemporary International Law, 1963 PRoC. Am.
Soc. INT'L L 147-62.
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attack; that non-members of the United Nations enjoy the same rights
of self-defense as do members; 71 that South Viet Nam is a political entity
entitled to claim the right of self-defense despite its origin as a "tem-
porary zone"; 72 and that the right of collective self-defense may be
exercised independent of a regional arrangement organized under
Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. 73 South Viet Nam would
have had the right to act in self-defense if an armed attack had occurred,
and the United States would then have had the right to act in collective
self-defense.
7 4
It is also important to determine whether the United States has
complied with the reporting requirement contained in Article 51 of
the United Nations Charter.75 The United States did encourage a
limited Security Council debate during August 1964 of the Gulf of
Tonkin "incidents." 76 Furthermore, the United States submitted two
reports to the Security Council during February 1965 concerning its
recourse to bombing North Viet Nam and the general character of the
war. And in January 1966 the United States submitted the Viet Nam
question to the Security Council.7 7 It seems reasonable to conclude that
the Security Council (or, for that matter, the General Assembly) is un-
willing and unable to intervene in any overt manner in the conflict in
71. For consideration of this question see BOwETr, op. cit. supra note 70, at 193-95.
72. See the first sentence of Article 6 of the Final Declaration: "The Conference recog-
nizes that the essential purpose of the agreement relating to Viet-Nam is to settle military
questions with a view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation line Is
provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or ter-
ritorial boundary," BACKGROUND INFORATION 58, 59. (Emphasis added.) For Saigon's rele-
vant conduct see LAcouruRE 24-31.
73. For a useful analysis see Bowzrr, op. cit. supra note 70, at 200-48; MCDOUoAL
& FELIIANO, op. cit. supra note 70, at 244-53.
74. That is, it would conform to expectations about what constitutes a permissible
claim to use force in self-defense. Despite considerable controversy about the wisdom of
the United States' involvement in the defense of Korea, there was no debate whatsoever
(outside of Communist countries) about the legality of a defensive claim. There was some
legal discussion about the propriety of United Nations involvement. For an argument in
favor of legality see McDougal & Gardner, The Veto and the Charter: An Interpretation
for Survival, in McDoUGAL & AssocIATEs, STuDIEs IN WORLD PUDLIC ORaE 718-60 (1960).
In retrospect, however, Korea exemplifies "an armed attack" for which force In response
is appropriate, even if used on the territory of the attacking state.
75. For communications sent by the United States to the United Nations and relied
upon to show compliance with the reporting requirements of Article 51 see VIETNAM
HEARINGS 634-40.
76. For a description of official United States views see Promoting the Maintenance of
International Peace and Security in Southeast Asia, H.R. REP. No. 1708, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1964); see Ambassador Stevenson's statement to the Security Council on August 5,
1964, in BACKGROUND INFORMATION 124-28.




Viet Nam. This conclusion is reinforced by the hostility of the Com-
munist states toward American proposals for a settlement s On the
other hand, there is no evidence of formal initiative by the members
of the United Nations to question the propriety of the United States
policies. The very serious procedural question posed is whether the
failure of the United Nations to act relieves the United States of its
burden to submit claims of self-defense to review by the organized
international community.79 A further question is whether any interna-
tional legal limitations upon national discretion apply when the United
Nations refrains from passing judgment on claims to use force in
self-defense.80
The Security Council failed to endorse American claims in Viet Nam,
and this failure was not merely a consequence of Soviet or Communist
opposition. Therefore, if the burden of justification for recourse to
self-defense is upon the claimant, inaction by the United Nations pro-
vides no legal comfort on the substantive issue-that is, the legality
of proportional self-defense given "the facts" in Viet Nam. As to the
procedural issue-that is, compliance with the reporting requirement
of Article 51-the United States may be considered to have complied
pro forma, but not in terms of the spirit of the Charter of the United
Nations.
The overriding purpose of the Charter is to commit states to use force
only as a last resort after the exhaustion of all other alternatives. In the
early period after 1954 the United States relied heavily on its unilateral
economic and military capability to protect the Saigon regime against
the Vietcong. No prior attempt was made, in accordance with Article
33, to settle the dispute by peaceful means.81 Yet the spirit of the
78. Neither China nor North Viet Nam indicate any willingness to acknowledge a
role for the United Nations. Of course, the exclusion of China from representation in the
United Nations may account for Chinese opposition to a U.N. solution. See also AD Hoc
CONGRESSIONAL CONFERENCE 5.
79. To what extent, that is, do states have residual discretion to determine the legality
of claims to use force in the event of United Nations inability to reach a dear decision?
80. The nature of these restraints may be of two varieties: first, the considerations
entering into the creation of a precedent; second, the restraints of customary international
law requiring that minimum necessary force be used to attain belligerent objectives and
requiring the maintenance of the distinction between military and non-military targets
and between combatants and non-combatants. One wonders whether these latter distinc-
tions can be maintained in a guerrilla war such as that in Viet Nam.
81. U.N. CHARTER art. 33(1):
The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the main-
tenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort
to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
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Charter requires that a nation claiming to undertake military action in
collective self-defense must first invoke the collective review and respon-
sibility of the United Nations. The United States did not call for
United Nations review until January 1966, that is, until a time when
the prospects for a favorable military solution at tolerable costs seemed
dismal, many months subsequent to bombing North Vietnamese ter-
ritory. As long as a military victory was anticipated, the United States
resented any attempt to question its discretion to use force or to share
its responsibility for obtaining a settlement.8 2 American recourse to
procedures for peaceful settlement came as a last rather than a first
resort. The United States had made no serious effort to complain about
alleged North Vietnamese violations of the Geneva Agreements, nor to
recommend a reconvening of a new Geneva Conference in the decade
of escalating commitment after 1954. Saigon submitted complaints to
the International Control Commission, but that body was neither con-
stituted nor intended to deal with the resumption of a war for control
of South Viet Nam that was apparently provoked by Saigon's refusal
to hold elections.
Further, not until 1965 did the United States welcome the inde-
pendent efforts of the Secretary-General to act as a negotiating inter-
mediary between Washington and Hanoi.83 Until it became evident
that a military victory over the Vietcong was not forthcoming, the
United States Government was hostile to suggestions emanating from
either U Thant (or De Gaulle) that a negotiated settlement was both
appropriate and attainable. The State Department's belated offer to
negotiate must be discounted in light of its public relations overtones
and our effort over the last decade to reverse the expectations of Geneva.
The United States negotiating position is also made less credible by
our failure to accord the N.L.F. diplomatic status as a party in con-
flict.8 4 This failure is especially dramatic in light of the N.L.F.'s ability
effectively to govern territory under its possession and Saigon's relative
inability to do so.
The American approach to negotiations lends support to the con-
clusion that our sporadic attempts at a peaceful settlement are belated
gestures, and that we seek "victory" at the negotiating table only when
it becomes unattainable on the battlefield. The United States showed
no willingness to subordinate national discretion to the collective will
of the organized international community. In fact, Viet Nam exempli-
82. Cf. note 39 supra.
83. Cf. note 38 supra.
84. See the recommendations to this effect in AD HoC CONGRMSSIONAL CONFERENCE 5.
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fies the American global strategy of using military power whenever
necessary to prevent Communist expansion and to determine these
necessary occasions by national decisions. This militant anti-Com-
munism represents the essence of unilateralism.s
One must conclude that the United States was determined to use
its military power as it saw fit in Viet Nam in the long period from 1954
to January 1966. In 1966 at last a belated, if halfhearted, attempt to
collectivize responsibility was made by appealing to the Security Coun-
cil to obtain, in the words of the Memorandum, "discussions looking
toward a peaceful settlement on the basis of the Geneva accords." The
Memorandum goes on to observe that "Indeed, since the United States
submission on January 1966, members of the Council have been notably
reluctant to proceed with any consideration of the Viet-Nam question."
Should this reluctance come as a surprise? Given the timing and magni-
tude of the American request it was inevitable that the United Nations
would find itself unable to do anything constructive at that stage.
United Nations inaction has deepened the awareness of the Organiza-
tion's limited ability to safeguard world peace, whenever the nuclear
superpowers take opposite sides of a violent conflict.80 Disputes must
be submitted prior to deep involvement if the United Nations is to
play a significant role.87 The war in Viet Nam presented many appro-
priate opportunities-the various steps up the escalation ladder-for
earlier, more effective, American recourse to the United Nations. But
during the entire war in Viet Nam, the United States has shown no
significant disposition to limit discretionary control over its national
military power by making constructive use of collective procedures of
peaceful settlement.
Proportionality. Even if we grant the Memorandum's contention that
North Viet Nam is guilty of aggression amounting to an armed attack
and that the United States is entitled to join in the collective self-
defense of South Viet Nam, important questions remain concerning
85. That is, it represents the claim to use force for purposes determined b) the
United States. The ideological quality of this unilateralism-its quality as an anti-
communist crusade-is suggested by "the understanding" attached by tie United States
to its ratification of the SEATO treaty limiting "its recognition of the effect of aggression
and armed attack ... to communist aggression." It is very unusual to restrict the appli-
cability of a security arrangement in terms of the ideological identity of the aggressor,
rather than in terms of national identity or with reference to the character of the aggres.
sion.
86. For a generalized approach to the problems of international conflict given the
structure of international society, see F. GROSS, WoRm POLrrCs AND TFxSio. ARAs (1965).
87. In the Congo Operation the outer limits of United Nations capacity were tested,
perhaps exceeded.
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the quantum, ratio, and modalities of force employed. Elementary prin-
ciples both of criminal and international law require that force legiti-
mately used must be reasonably calculated to attain the objective
pursued and be somewhat proportional to the provocation. As Mc-
Dougal and Feliciano observe, "[U] nderlying the processes of coercion
is a fundamental principle of economy.""" This fundamental principle
deriving from the restraints on violence found in the earliest version
of the just war doctrine has two attributes: the effectiveness of the force
employed and the avoidance of excessive force.89
The United States effort in Viet Nam combines ineffectual with ex-
cessive force. The level of military commitment to date seems designed
to avert defeat rather than to attain victory. All observers agree that if
the other side persists in its commitment, the search for a favorable
military solution will be exceedingly prolonged. Since the United
States has far greater military resources potentially available, our use
of insufficient force violates general norms of international law. 0 At
the same time, however, weapons and strategy are being employed to
cause destruction and incidental civilian damage without making
a proportional contribution to the military effort. This is particularly
true of our reliance upon strategic area bombing against dispersed
targets of small military value.91
The United States has at each juncture also claimed the legal right
to engage in disproportionate responses to specific provocations. In
August 1964 the Gulf of Tonkin incidents consisted of allegations that
North Vietnamese torpedo boats had "attacked" some American war-
ships on the high seas. Although no damage was reported the United
States responded by destroying several villages in which the boats were
88. McDOUGAL & F .sciANo, op. cit. supra note 70, at 35.
89. Implicit in the notion of economy of force is the idea that an unjust and Illegal
use of force is a futile use. The idea of futility is related to the attainability of a per.
missible belligerent objective and is difficult to measure. If a negotiated settlement rather
than victory is the objective, the amount of force required can only be assessed in terms
of the probable intentions of the other side, and these shift in response to many factors,
including their assessment of intentions.
90. Here again a reinterpretation of traditional thinking on war is needed to satisfy
the requirements of the nuclear age. American restraint in Viet Nam is explained In
part by concern with generating a nuclear war or, at least, provoking a wider war In
Southeast Asia. But what legal consequences follow if this inhibition leads to prolonged
violence in Viet Nam of an indecisive but devastating form?
91. The Conference participants were in agreement that the bombings in the north
were of little military value, while the diplomatic disadvantages were very serious.
Further escalation of the bombings, it was felt, could not be expected to improve the
situation.
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based.92 This was the first occasion on which force was used directly
against North Vietnamese territory and the justifications rested upon
a reprisal theory that was largely disassociated from the war in South
Viet Nam. Such a disproportionate ratio between action and reaction
is typical of great power politics in which superior force is used to
discipline a minor adversary. But this exaggerated response violates the
legal requisites of equivalency and symmetry between the injury sus-
tained and the response undertaken. Acceptance of mutuality and sym-
metry is basic to the whole conception of law in a sovereignty-centered
social order.
93
The bombing of North Viet Nam in February 1965 was also originally
justified as a "reprisal" for a successful attack by the Vietcong upon two
United States air bases, principally the one at Pleiku. Only in retrospect
was the justification for attacking North Viet Nam generalized to
collective self-defense of South Viet Nam.
94
No clear legal guidelines exist to measure the proportionality of force
used in self-defense. There is also some doubt whether proportionality
applies to the belligerent objective pursued or the size and character
of the aggression. If we assume that the appropriate quantum of military
force is that needed to neutralize the Vietcong (the mere agent, in the
American view, of Hanoi), then our military response (given our
capability) appears to be disproportionately low. A guerrilla war can
be won only by a minimum manpower ratio of 10:1, whereas the
present ratio is no better than 5:1. Our present level of commitment
of military forces merely prolongs the war; it does not aim to restore
peace by means of victory.95
If on the other hand, North Viet Nam and the United States are
considered as foreign nations intervening on opposite sides of an
armed conflict, then in terms of money, materiel, manpower, and
overtness the United States has intervened to a degree disproportion-
92. For a rather effective presentation of the North Vietnamese version of the Tonkin
Incidents see Nguyen Nghe, Facing the Skyhawks (pamphlet printed in Hanoi, 1964). For
an attack on the legality of the United States response see L F. Stone, International Law
and the Tonkin Bay Incidents, in Vmnr-NAs READFR 807-15. For the U.S. position see
references cited note 94 infra.
93. Cf. Kunz, The Distinctiveness of the International Legal System, 22 OHIo ST. LJ.
447 (1961).
94. Cf. the White House Statement of February 7, 1965, BACKGR uND INFormiATIoN
146-47; see also id. at 148-52 for the context used to justify extending the war to North
Viet Nam. No charge is made that the attacks on United States military installations were
ordered or performed by North Viet Nam personnel.
95. Cf. note 41 supra; see also General Gavin's testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, VmtNAm HEAmINs 270-71.
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ately greater than has North Viet Nam.00 In the early period of the
war the Vietcong captured most of its equipment from the Saigon
regime and the level of material support from the North was low.
The objective of American military strategy is apparently to destroy
enough that is important to Hanoi and the N.L.F. to bring about an
eventual de facto reduction of belligerent action or to force Hanoi to
make a satisfactory offer of negotiations. Are there any legal rules that
restrict such a strategy in terms of duration, intensity, or destruction?
This question seems so central to the future of international law that
it is regrettable, to say the least, that the Memorandum does not discuss
it. That formalistic document implies that if a state claims to use
force in self-defense, and supports its claim with a legal argument, and
if the United Nations does not explicitly overrule that claim, interna-
tional law has nothing further to contribute. 7 I would argue, in con-
trast, that it is crucial to determine what limiting considerations come
into play at this point. It is certainly a regressive approach to interna-
tional law to assume that if a state alleges "self-defense," it may in its
untrammeled discretion determine what military action is reasonably
necessary and proportional. The opposing belligerent strategies in Viet
Nam seem to call for legal explanation, especially in view of the
inability of either side to "win" or "settle" the war; the present standoff
causes great destruction of life and property without progressing toward
"a resolution" of the conflict.
The Relevance of Commitments to Defend South Yiet Nam. The
second main section of the Legal Adviser's Memorandum is devoted to
establishing that the United States "has made commitments and given
assurances, in various forms and at different times, to assist in the
defense of South Viet-Nam." Much confusion is generated by a very
misleading play on the word commitment. In one sense, commitment
means a pledge to act in a specified manner. In another sense, commit-
ment means an obligation of law to act in a specified manner.
During 1965-66 the United States clearly came to regard itself as
having made a commitment qua pledge to assist in the defense of South
Viet Nam. President Johnson expressed this pledge on many occasions.
Two examples are illustrative:
96. For an account of some features of the escalation see MANSFIELD, ET AL., REVORT To
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM., 89-I CONG., 2D SESS., THE VIETNAM CONFLIcr: Tilt
SUBSTANCE AND THE SHADOW (Comm. Print Jan. 6, 1966). See also SIIA'LEN xii, xxii; VIE.T-
NAM WITNESS 307-49.
97. A state, in effect, satisfies the requirements of international law merely by filing
a brief on its own behalf.
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We are in Viet Nam to fulfill one of the most solemn pledges
of the American nation. Three Presidents-President Eisenhower,
President Kennedy, and your present President-over 11 years
have committed themselves and have promised to help defend this
small and valiant nation.98
We are there because we have a promise to keep. Since 1954 every
American President has offered support to the people of South
Viet Nam. We have helped to build, and we have helped to defend.
Thus, over many years, we have made a national pledge to help
South Viet Nam defend its independence.
The present commitment entailing a major military effort is of a
very different order than the early conditional offers of economic and
military assistance made by President Eisenhower.100 American involve-
ment in Vietnam is usually traced to a letter from President Eisenhower
to Diem on October 23, 1954, in which the spirit of the undertaking
was expressed in the following sentence: "The purpose of this offer is
to assist the Government of Viet-Nam in developing and maintaining
a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or ag-
gression through military means." The letter contains no hint of a
pledge. In fact, the United States conditions its offer to assist with a
reciprocal expectation: "The Government of the United States expects
that this aid will be met by performance on the part of the Government
of Viet-Nam in undertaking needed reforms." 101 It is important to note
that the letter contained no reference to SEATO despite the formation
of the organization a few weeks before it was written, and that the role
of the United States was premised upon satisfactory domestic progress
in South Viet Nam.
As late as September 1963, President Kennedy said in a TV interview:
"In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to
win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we
can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it-the
people of Viet Nam-against the Communists. We are prepared to
continue to assist them, but I don't think that the war can be won unless
the people support the effort ... . "102 This expression of American in-
volvement emphasizes its discretionary and reversible character, and
again implies that the continuation of American assistance is condi-
98. N.Y. Times, July 29, 1965.
99. N.Y. Times, April 8, 1965.
100. LARsON & LARsoN, VIErNAM AND BEYo o 17-29 (1965).
101. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 67-68.
102. Id. at 99.
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tional upon certain steps being taken by the Saigon regime. Even in
1965 Secretary Rusk in an address to the Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law, provided a legal defense of
the United States position in Viet Nam that stopped short of averring
a commitment qua legal obligation. Mr. Rusk did not once refer to
SEATO in his rather complete coverage of the subject. The crucial
explanation of the American presence is contained in the following
passage:
In resisting the aggression against it, the Republic of Viet-Nam is
exercising its right of self-defense. It called upon us and other
states for assistance. And in the exercise of the right of collective
self-defense under the United Nations Charter, we and other
nations are providing such assistance. The American policy of
assisting South Viet-Nam to maintain its freedom was inaugurated
under President Eisenhower and continued under Presidents Ken-
nedy and Johnson. 0 3
Each successive increase in the level of American military involvement
has been accompanied by an intensification of rhetoric supporting our
presence in Viet Nam. By 1965 President Johnson was, as we observed,
referring to Viet Nam as "one of the most solemn national pledges." It
is disconcerting to realize that the United States has at each stage offset
a deteriorating situation in South Viet Nam by increasing both its
military and rhetorical commitment. This process discloses a gathering
momentum; at a certain point, policy becomes virtually irreversible.
President Johnson's use of the rhetoric of commitment communicates
the irreversibility of this policy and conveys a sense of the futility and
irrelevance of criticism. If we have a commitment of honor, contrary
considerations of prudence and cost are of no concern.104
But no commitment qua pledge has the capacity to generate a com-
mitment qua legal obligation. The Administration seems to want
simultaneously to invoke both senses of the notion of commitment in
order to blunt and confuse criticism. A commitment qua legal obliga-
tion is, by definition, illegal to renounce. To speak of commitment in
a legal memorandum is particularly misleading. To the extent that we
have any commitment it is a pledge of policy.
Secretary Rusk has injected a further confusion into the debate by
his stress on "the SEATO commitment" in the course of his testimony
103. Rusk, Address, 1965 PRoc. Am. SOC. INT'L L. 251-52.
104. For this reason the Administration is hostile to domestic criticism. It Is, above
all, unresponsive to this qualitative aspect of our presence in Viet Nam. Cf. President




before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the early months
of 1966.105 He said, for instance, in his prepared statement: "It is this
fundamental SEATO obligation that has from the outset guided our
actions in Vietnam."' 0 6 The notion of the obligation is derived from
Article IV (1) of the SEATO treaty which says that "each party recog-
nizes that aggression by means of armed attack... would endanger its
own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet
the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."
It is somewhat doubtful that Article IV(1) can be properly invoked at
all in Viet Nam because of the difficulty of establishing "an armed
attack."' 0 7 Secretary Rusk contends, however, that this provision not
only authorizes but obliges the United States to act in the defense of
South Viet Nam. 08
Ambiguity again abounds. If the commitment to act in Viet Nam is
incorporated in a treaty, the United States is legally bound. Such an
interpretation of Article IV(l) would apply equally to other states that
have ratified the SEATO treaty. None of the other SEATO signatories
acknowledge such "a commitment" to fulfill a duty of collective self-
defense, nor does the United States contend they have one. France and
Pakistan oppose altogether any military effort on behalf of the Saigon
regime undertaken by outside states.
Secretary Rusk later softened his insistence that Article IV(l) imposed
a legal commitment qua obligation upon the United States. In an ex-
change with Senator Fulbright during Senate hearings on Viet Nam,
Mr. Rusk offered the following explanation:
The Chairman. ... do you maintain that we had an obligation
under the Southeastern Asian Treaty to come to the assistance,
all-out assistance of South Vietnam? Is that very clear?
Secretary Rusk. It seems clear to me, sir, that this was an obliga-
tion-
105. Id. at 567. Secretary Rusk explains to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
that "the language of this treaty is worth careful attention. The obligation it impoms is
not only joint but several. That is not only collective but individual.
"The finding that an armed attack has occurred does not have to be made by a collective
determination before the obligation of each member becomes operative." Cf. the shifting
views of SEATO obligation recounted in Young, The Southeast Asia Crisis, 1963 HAM-
MNAUSKJOLD FORUM 54. Even Mr. Young, a staunch defender of administration policy, notes
that "Until the crisis in Laos in 1961, the United States looked upon SEATO as a collective
organization which would take military action, with all eight members participating in
the actions as well as the decision." Id. at 59.
106. Vm-nAm HEamuNcs 567; note the absence of reference to SEATO in Rusk, supra
note 103, and in the 1965 legal memorandum, supra note 45.
107. See generally SEATO, 3-45, 87-163 (Afodelski ed. 1962).
108. VmrNA HEAmrs 567.
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The Chairman. Unilateral.
Secretary Rusk. An obligation of policy. It is rooted in the policy
of the treaty. I am not now saying if we had decided we would not
lift a finger about Southeast Asia that we could be sued in a court
and be convicted of breaking a treaty. 10 9
It seems evident if an armed attack has been established, the treaty
imposes a legal obligation to engage in collective self-defense of the
victim. But in the absence of a collective determination by the SEATO
membership that an armed attack has taken place, it is difficult to main-
tain that Article IV(l) does more than authorize discretionary action
in appropriate circumstances.
The Memorandum argues that "the treaty does not require a collec-
tive determination that an armed attack has occurred in order that
the obligation of Article IV(l) become operative. Nor does the pro-
vision require collective decision on actions to be taken to meet the
common danger." 110 This interpretation of Article IV(l) is a blatant
endorsement of extreme unilateralism, made more insidious by its
pretense of "obligation" and its invocation of the multilateral or re-
gional scaffolding of SEATO. Here the legal position of the State
Department displays maximum cynicism, resorting to international
law to obscure the national character of military action. In essence, the
United States claims that it is under an obligation to determine for
itself when an armed attack has occurred, and that once this determina-
tion is made there arises a further obligation to act in response. This
justification for recourse to force is reminiscent of the international law
of war prior to World War I, when states were free to decide for them-
selves when to go to war."' The regressive tendency of this position is
further intensified by applying it in a situation where there was a
background of civil war and where the alleged aggression was low-scale,
extended over time, and covert. Under "the Rusk Doctrine" a country
alleging "armed attack" seems free to act in self-defense whenever it
wishes. The rhetoric of commitment seems connected with the effort
to make the policy of support for Saigon irreversible in domestic arenas
and credible in external arenas, especially in Saigon and Hanoi, but it
has little to do with an appreciation of the relevance of international
law to United States action in Viet Nam.
The important underlying question is whether it is permissible to
109. Id. at 45; see also id. at 7-8.
110. Id. at 567.
111. For a general survey of progressive attempts to regulate recourse to war see
WRIGr, THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE ELIMINATION OF WAR (1961).
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construe an occurrence of "an armed attack" in the circumstances of
the internal war in South Viet Nam. If an armed attack can be held to
have occurred, then both self-defense and collective self-defense are
permissible. The legal status of a claim of collective self-defense is not
improved by embedding the claim in a collective defense arrangement.
In fact, the collective nature of an arrangement such as SEATO might
imply some obligation to attempt recourse to consultative and collective
procedures before acting, at least to determine whether an armed attack
has occurred and by whom. Under Secretary Rusk's interpretation of
the treaty, SEATO members with opposing views on the issue of which
side committed an armed attack could become "obligated" to act in
"collective self-defense" against one another.' 2 Surely this is the re-
ductio ad absurdum of collective self-defense.
In terms of both world order and the original understanding of
SEATO, the conflict in Viet Nam calls for action, if at all, under
Article IV(2).x13 To categorize the conflict under Article IV(l) would
seem to require a unanimous collective determination that the assistance
given by Hanoi to the Vietcong amounted to an armed attack. Once
that determination had been made, it might seem plausible to maintain
that the obligation to act in collective self-defense exists on a joint
and several basis, and that the United States might join in the defense
of the victim of the armed attack without further collective authoriza-
tion. Unlike the State Department position, the approach outlined in
this paragraph requires that a multilateral determination of the facts
precede acts of commitment. The United States might help build a
more peaceful world by taking seriously the collective procedures
governing the use of force which it has taken such an active role in
creating.
The Geneva Accords of 1954. The agreements at Geneva were cast
in the form of a cease-fire arrangement and a declaration of an agreed
procedure for achieving a post-war settlement. The parties to the first
war in Viet Nam were the French and the Vietminh, and the agree-
ments were between their respective military commanders. The other
powers at Geneva were mere sureties. At Ho Chi Minh's insistence
the Saigon regime did not participate; Saigon was evidently dissatisfied
from the outset with the terms of settlement.114 The United States
112. E.g., suppose Laos and Thailand became involved in a conflict in which each
state accused the other of being an aggressor-and this is not impossible.
113. Cf. SEATO op. cit. supra note 107, at xiv. It is made dear both that internal
conflicts abetted by subversion were to be treated under Article IV(2) and that this pro-
vision required consultation as a prerequisite to action and had become "a dead letter."
114. See ViET-NAm WVrrEss 74-83. Jean Lacouture has written recently that France
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Government was also reluctant to regard the Geneva settlement as
binding."5,
The Final Declaration required elections to be held in July of 1956
"under the supervision of an international commission composed of
representatives of the Member States of the International Supervisory
Commission."' 6 The Memorandum points out that South Viet Nam
"did not sign the cease-fire agreement of 1954, nor did it adhere to the
Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference" and adds that "the South
Vietnamese Government at that time gave notice of its objection in
particular to the election provisions of the accords." At the time of the
Geneva proceedings, the Saigon regime exerted control over certain
areas in the South, and this awkward fact made it unrealistic to suppose
that the Geneva terms of settlement would ever be voluntarily carried
out. When Diem came to power and the United States moved in to fill
the place left vacant by the departure of the French, it became clear,
especially in view of the nation-wide popularity of Ho Chi Minh, that
the contemplated elections would never be held.117 In a sense it was
naive of Hanoi to accept the Geneva arrangement or to rely upon its
implementation.118
Saigon objected to the election provisions from the outset because it
hoped for a permanent partition of Viet Nam. But permanent partition
was so deeply incompatible with the objective sought by the Vietminh
in the war against the French that it is hardly reasonable to expect
Hanoi to acquiesce. In a sense, Hanoi's willingness to cooperate with
the Geneva arrangement until 1956 is more surprising than is its later
effort to revive the war in Viet Nam.
The Memorandum says that even assuming the election provisions
were binding on South Viet Nam, there was no breach of obligation
arising from Saigon's failure "to engage in consultations in 1955, with
a view to holding elections in 1956." The justification offered for
Saigon's action is that "the conditions in North Viet Nam during that
period were such as to make impossible any free and meaningful ex-
pression of popular will." But the election provision in the Final Decla-
bears a heavy responsibility for its failure to secure full implementation of the Geneva
"solution" before withdrawing from Viet Nam; in Lacouture's view France's premature
withdrawal created a political vacuum immediately filled by the United States. LACOUTURE
657.
115. ViEr-NAM WrrNEss 69-83; see LANCASTER 313-58 for a general account of the
Geneva settlement.
116. See Article 7. Final Declaration of Geneva Conference, July 21, 1954, BACKGROUND
INFORMATION 58, 59.
117. LANCAsTER 315-16.
118. Id. at 313-37.
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ration stated no preconditions about the form of interim government in
the two zones, and the type of governmental control existing in the
North could have been and presumably was anticipated by those who
drew up the Final Declaration. The meaning of "free elections" in
Communist countries was well known to all countries including the
United States, and the conditions prevailing in South Viet Nam were
no more conducive to popular expressions of will.10 The real objection
to the elections was a simple one-namely, the assurance that Ho Chi
Minh would win.120 The Memorandum offers only a self-serving en-
dorsement of Saigon's refusal to go along with the terms of settlement,
although they had been endorsed by the United States representative,
Bedell Smith.
121
The Memorandum suggests in footnote 10, that North Viet Nam's
remedies, had there been "a breach of obligation by the South, lay in
discussion with Saigon, perhaps in an appeal to the co-chairmen of
the Geneva conference, or in a reconvening of the conference to con-
sider the situation." In light of the failure of the United States to make
use of international remedies which it argues are obligatory for Hanoi,
this statement is a shocking instance of legal doubletalk. Footnote 10
ends by saying that "Under international law, North Viet Nam had no
right to use force outside its own zone in order to secure its political
objectives." This again is misleading. No authoritative rules govern the
action of the parties in the event that a settlement of internal war breaks
down. Certainly if the settlement is not binding on all the parties,
no one of them is bound by its constraints. In the absence of the
Geneva Accords, Saigon would not exist as a political entity. If Saigon
repudiates the Accords, Hanoi would seem to be legally free to resume
the pursuit of its political objectives and to ignore the creation of a
temporary zone in the South. The principle of mutuality of obligation
makes it inappropriate to argue that Saigon is free to ignore the
Geneva machinery but that Hanoi is bound to observe it.
Furthermore, international law does not forbid the use of force within
a single state. If Hanoi may regard Viet Nam as a single country
between 1954 and 1956, its recourse to force in pursuit of political
objectives is not prohibited even assuming that its "guidance" and "di-
rection" of the Vietcong constitute "a use" of force by North Viet Nam.
The Memorandum misleadingly implies that the International Con-
119. On the conduct of elections in Viet Nam see Fall, vietnam's Twelve Elections,
The New Republic, May 14, 1966, pp. 12-15.
120. WARNER 84-106, 142-43; cf. VETNAMt 191-94, 210-35 (Gettleman ed.).
121. For text of Smith's statement see BACKGROUND INFO.ATiON 61.
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trol Commission (ICC) endorsed the action of the United States and
Saigon and condemned the action of North Viet Nam. Both sides were
criticized severely by the ICC for violating provisions of the Geneva
Accords. 122 It would appear that the massive military aid given to
Saigon by the United States was the most overt and disrupting viola-
tion, directly contravening the prohibition on the entry of foreign
military forces and new military equipment. 123 According to the reason-
ing of footnote 10, North Viet Nam's remedy lay in discussion and the
Geneva machinery. But a quite different line of legal reasoning is taken
to justify American activity: 124 action otherwise prohibited by the
Geneva Accords is "justified by the international law principle that a
material breach of an agreement by one party entitles the other at least
to withhold compliance with an equivalent, corresponding, or related
provision until the defaulting party is prepared to honor its obliga-
tions." One wonders why this "international law principle" is not
equally available to North Viet Nam after Saigon's refusal even to
consult about holding elections. Why is Hanoi bound by the reasoning
of footnote 10 and Washington entitled to the reasoning of reciprocal
breach? The self-serving argument of the Memorandum confers com-
petence upon the United States and Saigon to find that a breach has
taken place and to select a suitable remedy, but permits Hanoi only
to allege a breach, and forbids it to take countervailing action until the
breach has been impartially verified.
The Authority of the President under the Constitution. I agree with
the Legal Adviser's analysis that the President possesses the constitu-
tional authority to use American military forces in Viet Nam without
a declaration of war. Past practice and present policy support this con-
clusion. To declare war against North Viet Nam would further rigidify
our own expectations about an acceptable outcome and it would almost
certainly escalate the conflict. It might activate dormant collective de-
fense arrangements between North Viet Nam and its allies.
But the Constitution is relevant in another way not discussed by the
Memorandum. The President is bound to act in accordance with gov-
erning law, including international law. The customary and treaty
norms of international law enjoy the status of "the law of the land"
and the President has no discretion to violate these norms in the course
122. For a representative sample see VITNAM, op. cit. supra note 120, at 160-90.
123. Cf. Articles 17, 18, Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam, 3AcK-
GROUND INFORMATION 28, 34-35.
124. Cf. Department of State White Paper, Aggression from the North, in VIET-NAM




of pursuing objectives of foreign policy. An impartial determination of
the compatibility of our action in Viet Nam with international law is
highly relevant to the constitutionality of the exercise of Presidential
authority in Viet Nam.
The President has the constitutional authority to commit our armed
services to the defense of South Viet Nam without a declaration of war
provided that such "a commitment" is otherwise in accord with inter-
national law. Whether all or part of the United States action violates
international law is also a constitutional question. International law
offers no authoritative guidance as to the use of force within South Viet
Nam, but the bombing of North Viet Nam appears to be an unconsti-
tutional use of Presidential authority as well as a violation of interna-
tional law.
IV
It is appropriate to reflect on the role of the international law-yer in
a legal controversy of the sort generated by our role in Viet Nam. The
rather keen interest in this controversy about international law results
mostly from intense disagreement about the overall wisdom of our
foreign policy rather than curiosity about the content of the law on the
subject. International law has therefore been used as an instrument
of persuasion by those who oppose or favor our Viet Nam policy on
political grounds. In such a debate we assume that the United States
strives to be law-abiding and that, therefore, it is important for partisans
of existing policy to demonstrate the compatibility between law and
policy and for opponents of the policy to demonstrate the opposite.
This use of international law to bolster or bludgeon foreign policy
positions is unfortunate. It creates the impression that international law
serves to inflame debate rather than to guide or shape public policy-an
impression fostered by the State Department Memorandum. After a
decade of fighting in Viet Nam, the Memorandum was issued in re-
sponse to legal criticisms made by private groups and echoed by a
few dissident members of Congress. It blandly whitewashed the existing
government position. The tone is self-assured, the method legalistic,
and the contribution to an informed understanding of the issues,
minimal. None of the difficult questions of legal analysis are considered.
In this intellectual context international lawyers with an independent
voice need to be heard.
An international lawyer writing about an ongoing war cannot hope
to reach clear conclusions about all the legal issues involved. It is vir-
tually impossible to unravel conflicting facts underlying conflicting legal
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claims. Of course, we can hope that a legal commentator will acknowl-
edge the uncertainties about the facts and that he will offer explicit
reasons for resolving ambiguities in the way and to the extent that
he does.
125
Would it not be better, one is tempted to insist, for international
lawyers to avoid so controversial and indeterminate a subject as the
legal status of American participation in the war in Viet Nam? I think
it important openly to raise this question of propriety, but clearly to
answer it in the negative. The scholar has the crucial task of demon-
strating the intractability of many, although not of all, the legal issues.
Such an undertaking defeats, or calls into serious question, the dogmatic
over-clarification of legal issues that arises in the more popular dis-
cussions of foreign policy questions. The international lawyer writing
in the spirit of scholarly inquiry may have more to contribute by
raising the appropriate questions than by purporting to give authorita-
tive answers. He may enable public debate to adopt a more construc-
tive and sophisticated approach to the legal issues.
And, finally, an international lawyer not employed by a government
can help modify a distorted nationalistic perspective. An international
lawyer is, of course, a citizen with strong views on national policy, but
his outlook is universalized by the realization that the function of law
in world affairs is to reconcile inconsistent national goals. The interna-
tional lawyer seeks a legal solution that is based upon an appreciation,
although not always an acceptance, of the position of "the other side"
in an international dispute. His goal is a system of world order in which
all nations are constrained for the common good by rules and by pro-
cedures for their interpretation and enforcement. This implies a new
kind of patriotism, one that is convinced that to succeed, the nation must
act within the law in its foreign as well as its domestic undertakings.
But are there occasions upon which it would be proper for a nation
to violate international law? It may be contended that the United States
must act as it does in Viet Nam because the international procedures of
Geneva, the United Nations, and SEATO offer no protection to a
victim of aggression such as South Viet Nam. The United States is
acting, in this view, to fill a vacuum created by the failures of inter-
125. Cf. the inscription attributed to "An Old Jew of Galicia" in MILOSz, 'Mm CAPTnvE
MIND 2 (1953):
When someone is honestly 55% right, that's very good and there's no use wrangling.
And if someone is 60% right, it's wonderful, and let him thank God. But what's to
be said about 75% right? Wise people say this is suspicious. Well, and what about




national regulatory machinery. In fact, it is often suggested, the refusal
of the United States to act would tempt potential aggressors. Those
who emphasize the obligations and ambiguities of power often talk in
this vein and warn of the sterility of legalism in foreign affairs. 20 In
general terms, this warning is sound, but its very generality is no guide
to specific action, especially in the nuclear age. It remains essential to
vindicate as explicitly as possible the reasons that might justify violating
legal expectations about the use of military power in each instance by
documented reference to overriding policies; slogans about peace,
security, and freedom are not enough. The analysis must be so condi-
tioned by the specific circumstances that it will not always justify the
use of force. I do not believe that such an argument can convincingly
be made with respect to Viet Nam, and therefore I affirm the relevance
of legal criteria of limitation. If an argument in favor of military inter-
vention is offered, then it should stress the limits and weaknesses of law
or the priority of national over international concerns. -T We would
then gain a better understanding of what law can and cannot do than
is acquired by the manipulative straining of legal rules into contrived
coincidence wi:h national policies. 128
V
The foregoing analysis points to the following set of conclusions:
1) The United States insistence upon treating North Vietnamese
assistance to the Vietcong as "an armed attack" justifying recourse to
"self-defense" goes a long way toward abolishing the legal significance
of the distinction between civil war and international war. Without this
distinction, we weaken a principal constraint upon the scope and scale
of violence in international affairs-the confinement of violence as-
sociated with internal wars to the territory of a single political unit.'I
Another adverse consequence of permitting "self-defense" in response
to covert aggression is to entrust nations with very wide discretion to
determine for themselves the occasions upon which recourse to overt
126. See generally the writings of the critical legalists. E.g., KENNAN, Antrue.w, Di'Lo-
MAcy 1900-1950, 95, 96 and 100; foRGFNrUU, IN DrEFEsE or NEn NATM.NAL IranEsir (1951).
127. Little systematic attention has been given to the rationale and logic for rejecting
the claims of law under certain circumstances in human affairs. The consequence is to
lead perceptions into naive over-assertions or cynical denials of the relevance of law to
behavior.
128. There is a role for adversary presentation, but there is a more important need
to seek bases upon which to appraise adversary claims.
129. One can emphasize the refusal to permit external sanctuary for actors supporting
an internal war as a constructive precedent, but its reciprocal operation creates dangers
of unrestrained violence. See generally IiAL E.mN, Librr WAR iN "iE NUCLEn , AGE (1963).
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violence across international boundaries is permissible.'3 0 An extension
of the doctrine of self-defense would defeat a principal purpose of the
United Nations Charter-the delineation of fixed, narrow limits upon
the use of overt violence by states in dispute with one another.
2) The United States made no serious attempt to exhaust interna-
tional remedies prior to recourse to unilateral military power. The
gradual unfolding of the conflict provided a long period during which
attempts at negotiated settlement could have taken place. Only belatedly
and in a pro forma fashion did the United States refer the dispute to
the United Nations. The United States made no attempt to comply
with "the international law principle" alleged by footnote 10 of the
Memorandum to govern the action of North Viet Nam. Nor did it
attempt during the early phases of the war to subordinate its discretion
to the Geneva machinery. No use was made even of the consultative
framework of SEATO, an organization inspired by United States initia-
tive for the specific purpose of inhibiting Communist aggression in
Southeast Asia.' 3 ' Policies of force were unilaterally adopted and put
into execution; no account was taken of the procedural devices created
to give a collective quality to decisions about the use of force. Yet the
prospect for controlling violence in world affairs depends upon the
growth of limiting procedural rules and principles.
3) By extending the scope of violence beyond the territory of South
Viet Nam the United States has created an unfortunate precedent in
international affairs. Where international institutions fail to provide
clear guidance as to the character of permissible action, national
actions create quasi-legislative precedents. In view of the background
of the conflict in Viet Nam (including the expectation that South Viet
Nam would be incorporated into a unified Viet Nam under the control
of Hanoi after the French departure), the American decision to bomb
North Viet Nam sets an unfortunate precedent. If North Viet Nam and
its allies had the will and capability to employ equivalent military
force, the precedent would even allow them to claim the right to bomb
United States territory in reprisal.
4) The widespread domestic instability in the Afro-Asian world
points up the need for an approach to internal war that aims above all
to insulate this class of conflict from intervention by the great powers.
The early use of peace observation forces, border control machinery,
restraints on the introduction of foreign military personnel, and standby
130. Cf. Henkin, supra note 70.
131. On the creation Of SEATO sep SEATO, op. cit. supra note 107, introduction, xiii-
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mediation appears possible and beneficial. Responses to allegations of
"aggression" should be verified prior to the unilateral use of defensive
force, especially when time is available. Claims of covert aggression
might then be verified with sufficient authority and speed to mobilize
support for community security actions.
5) In the last analysis, powerful nations have a responsibility to use
defensive force to frustrate aggression when international machinery is
paralyzed. Viet Nam, however, does not provide a good illustration of
the proper discharge of this responsibility. North Viet Nam's action
does not seem to constitute "aggression." Available international
machinery was not used in a proper fashion. The domestic conditions
prevailing in South Viet Nam were themselves so inconsistent with
prevailing ideals of welfare, progress, and freedom that it is difficult to
claim that the society would be better off as a result of a Saigon
victory. The massive American presence has proved to be a net
detriment, greatly escalating the war, tearing apart the fabric of
Vietnamese society, and yet not likely to alter significantly the political
outcome. The balance of domestic and area forces seems so favorable
to the Vietcong that it is unlikely that the N.L.F. can be kept forever
from political control. The sacrifice of lives and property merely post-
pones what appears to be an inevitable result. The United States
voluntarily assumed a political responsibility for the defense of South
Viet Nam that has been gradually converted into a political commit-
ment and a self-proclaimed test of our devotion to the concept of
collective self-defense. This responsibility is inconsistent with the re-
quirements of world order to the extent that it depends upon unilateral
prerogatives to use military power. The national interest of the United
States would be better served by the embrace of cosmopolitan isola-
tionism--either we act in conjunction with others or we withdraw. We
are the most powerful nation in world history. It is hubris to suppose,
however, that we are the policemen of the world.13- Our wasted efforts
in Viet Nam suggest the futility and frustration of the politics of over-
commitment. We are not the only country in the world concerned with
containing Communism. If we cannot find cooperative bases for action
132. Even Secretary Rusk has pointed out the limitations upon American power in
emphatic terms: "We do not regard ourselves as the policeman of the univere. ... If
other governments, other institutions, or other regional organizations can find solutions to
the quarrels which disturb this present scene, we are anxious to have this occur." VLETNANS
HFAsmNGS 563; and Secretary McNamara stated in an address to the American Society of
Newspaper Editors delivered at Montreal on May 18, 1966: ". . . neither conscience nor
sanity itself suggests that the United States is, should, or could be the global gendarme."
N.Y. Times, May 19, 1966, p. 11.
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we will dissipate our moral and material energies in a series of Viet
Nams. The tragedy of Viet Nam provides an occasion for rethinking the
complex problems of use of military power in world affairs and calls for
an examination of the increasingly imperial role of the United States
in international society. Perhaps we will discover the relevance of
international law to the planning and execution of foreign policy as
well as to its justification. Certainly the talents of the State Depart-
ment's Legal Adviser are wasted if he is to be merely an official apologist
summoned long after our President has proclaimed "a solemn national
commitment."
